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Abstract. The protection of users’ data conforming to best practice
and legislation is one of the main challenges in computer science. Very
often, large-scale data leaks remind us that the state of the art in data
privacy and anonymity is severely lacking. The complexity of modern sys-
tems make it impossible for software architect to create secure software
that correctly implements privacy policies without the help of automated
tools. The academic community needs to invest more effort in the formal
modelization of security and anonymity properties, providing a deeper
understanding of the underlying concepts and challenges and allowing
the creation of automated tools to help software architects and develop-
ers. This track provides numerous contributions to the formal modeling
of security and anonymity properties and the creation of tools to verify
them on large-scale software projects.
1 Introduction
Security and Anonymity Properties. Security and privacy are fundamental in-
terests of computer science research. Security refers to the guarantee that the
computer system being used does not act against the interest of the user, either
maliciously or accidentally. The security of a system is usually associated with
the following properties [33, 41, 47]:
Confidentiality Sensitive information about the user that is handled by the
system cannot be accessed by unauthorized third parties;
Integrity Information handled by the system cannot be deleted, altered or mod-
ified by unauthorized third parties; and
Authentication Each agent interacting with the system is who they claim to
be.
However, these basic properties are not defining which potentially sensitive in-
formation about the user is the system handling, or whether the system should
have access to such information to start with [6, 11, 35]. This is the reason why
we add the following property:
Anonymity The user has control on what information about them is collected
by the system, and can decide how it is collected and used, by whom, and
for what purpose.
While other interesting properties (e.g. availability) are considered in computer
science research, this track focuses on the four properties listed above, as they
allow the user to trust that their data is properly handled by the system and
not used against them by third parties.
Problem: Large Attack Surface. [3, 21, 24, 44] The complexity of modern systems
means that the attack surface for a malicious agent is huge. The system can be
compromised at any level and leak information in hundred of possible ways,
like improperly handling access rights to databases, or leaking kernel memory
through improperly written implementations, or even allowing private keys to
be recovered by analyzing the system’s energy consumption. Complex protocol
interaction means that different agents are executing their parts of the protocol
on machines with different environment and operative systems.
Solution: Formal Models and Automated Tools. [15, 27, 34] The approach to
secure such a complex system is the modelization of security protocols with
formal languages, and of the security properties to be preserved with formal
logics. This formalization effort allows us to produce automated techniques and
tools that verify whether the protocols and their implementations respect the
security requirements.
The formal models of systems, protocols and properties are simpler and more
intuitive than their implementations, since they abstract away irrelevant details.
This allows users and developers to examine the properties themselves and de-
termine if they satisfy their needs, thus making it easier for the user to trust that
the system is doing what they expect it to do and does not have any harmful
behavior, either intentional or accidental.
We will discuss the use of formal methods and tools to improve the security
at both the software implementation and the protocol level.
1.1 The Software Level
Attacks at the software level exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of a
secure system that are not present in the system specification. It is common
for software developers and engineers to introduce bugs in an implementation,
particularly when using non-strongly-typed languages [38]. Bugs that can be used
to compromise the security and privacy properties of the system are known as
vulnerabilities. It is common for an attacker targeting a specific system to start
analyzing the system for such vulnerabilities, then writing an exploit leveraging
on some vulnerabilities to steal information from or take control of the system
[17].
Vulnerabilities are categorized by cause and by severity [2, 42]. Categories by
cause include input and access validation errors, race conditions, secret infor-
mation leaks, and many more. In particular, information leaks endanger both
security and privacy properties, leaking confidential user data or even private
cryptographic keys, like in the case of the Heartbleed bug.
Severity is normally categorized in High, Medium and Low, where High sever-
ity means that the vulnerability makes it possible for an attacker to violate the
security properties of the system, Low severity means that the vulnerability only
provides the attacker with more information to look for more severe vulnerabil-
ities, and Medium severity is anything that is not High or Low severity.
Helping software developers writing bug-free code is a large field of com-
puter science and software engineering. However, from the security and privacy
perspective we have a slightly different view of the problem, since we are only
interested in finding and reducing vulnerabilities.
For instance, considering the handling of private and confidential information,
we can develop tools that track how a given implementation of a protocol handles
such information. Taint analysis [32, 45] and information leakage computation
techniques [9, 10, 22, 46] can trace the flow of information in a particular system
given its source code, thus detecting vulnerabilities that would allow private
information to be inferred by unauthorized users. The track presents a new state
of the art in the automated detection of information leaks in large projects.
Additionally, protocol implementations can leverage the formal specifications
of the protocols. Automated tools [8, 23, 25, 48] can be used to verify whether an
implementation respects the formal protocol implementation it is supposed to
implement, or even automatically produce code from the protocol specifications
that is guaranteed to correctly implement them, avoiding vulnerabilities caused
by design errors. The track presents a new formal framework to help software
developers validate their software for the complex case of cyber-physical systems.
1.2 The Protocol Level
Protocols model the exchange of communications and data between agents to
obtain a common goal. The formalization of protocols is necessary to determine
univocally what each agent is supposed to do, and to be able to prove that
their behavior contributes to achieving the goal of the protocol. Many formal
languages for protocols exist, capturing different primitives and granularity of
the communications. One of the classical approaches is Burrows-Abadi-Needham
(BAN) logic [13], used to model authentication systems since it allows to model
what agents know and believe on each other during the protocol, and it assumes
that the network itself is vulnerable to tampering and information leakage.
More recently, model checking techniques and properties have been shown to
be more effective than BAN logic to model protocols and automatically verify
whether they respect security properties.
Information-theoretical properties like non-interference [20, 39] can be used
to prove that the communications of an agent do not leak information about the
agent’s secret information in any way, allowing to automatically verify whether
a protocols guarantees confidentiality and anonymity. When this strong prop-
erty is impossible to guarantee while achieving the protocol’s goal, quantitative
leakage computation [12, 16, 28, 43] can prove that the amount of secret informa-
tion leaked is too small to significantly hinder the confidentiality and anonymity
properties, or at worst to exactly quantify the loss of anonymity allowing the
agent to decide if it is an acceptable price to pay to run the protocol.
Temporal properties [5, 14, 36] are concerned with the sequence of operations
performed by the protocol, and can be used to prove that the required steps to
achieve the protocol’s goal are always executed correctly and in the correct order.
This enables formally verifying that if the protocol succeeds all the proper steps
have been executed, and if it fails it does so graciously and properly notifying the
agents of the cause of the failure. Temporal properties are very close to the pro-
tocol’s flow of operations, and mature tools exist [8, 23, 25, 48] to automatically
verify that they are respected even by complex system interactions.
Cryptographic properties [1, 7, 19, 30] are used to guarantee security proper-
ties of the protocol, and are often based on complexity results of problems that
are hard to treat at the current state of the art. Cryptographic properties can
be used to guarantee the hardness of retrieving private keys in shared-key and
public-key cryptosystems, verify agents’ identities in authentication schemes,
provide secure key exchange protocols and multiparty computation over unse-
cured channels, and be used to express most security properties. While some of
the hardness results they are based on are currently unproven, and sometimes
technological advancements may cripple protocols previously considered secure,
cryptographic properties and primitives are the building blocks of most of the
successful secure protocols currently used in any computer system.
The definition of secure and anonymous protocols in terms of formal mod-
els and properties allows automated verification of the protocols’ correctness.
This is a fundamental requirement for a user to be able to trust that the pro-
tocol is correctly designed to defend their interests and the security of their
data. While many authentication and confidentiality properties can be defined
as cryptographic trace properties and analyzed with temporal logics, anonymity
properties depend on the data flow and interaction between different agents and
are hard to define in terms of traces. The track presents contributions to model
systems with process calculi and model transformations, allowing the expression
and formal verification of anonymity properties.
Privacy and anonymity policies are often defined by legislative bodies in
natural language. The duty of translating these policies into formal properties
falls on computer scientists. Due to the inherent ambiguity of natural language,
the formalization of policies may not correspond with the legislator’s intent.
Also, since protocols can be distributed among different legislative jurisdictions,
it is not clear that all agents involved conform to the same rules and enforce the
required policies. The track presents contributions to validate whether formal
security protocols correctly implement legislative policies, and to automatically
negotiate security policies between agents to guarantee that data owners and
consumers agree on the policies for the treatment of the data.
2 Contribution to the Track
This track provides several contributions to apply formal methods to improve the
security and privacy of system at the software and protocol levels. A summary
is given here.
2.1 On Building Secure Software
The track offers two major contributions on using information flow and formal
models to find vulnerabilities in software implementations:
– Information leaks in software may have devastating consequences, as demon-
strated for instance by the Heartbleed bug. Academic work focuses on infor-
mation theory to compute the amount of information leaked by a software
implementation, but tools able to perform an automated analysis of real-
world complex C code are still lacking. On the other hand, effective working
solutions rely on ad-hoc principles that have little theoretical justification.
In [29], the authors bridge this chasm between advanced theoretical work
and concrete practical needs of programmers developing real world software.
They present an analysis, based on clear security principles and verification
tools, which is largely automatic and effective in detecting information leaks
in complex C code running everyday on millions of systems worldwide.
– Cyber-physical systems are computer systems that interact with physical ob-
jects. Such systems are composed of several software components executed on
different processors and interconnected through physical buses. These com-
plex systems collocate functions operating at different security levels, which
can introduce unexpected interactions that affect system security. The se-
curity policy for these systems is realized through various complex physical
or logical mechanisms. The security policy, as a stakeholder goal, is then
refined into system requirements and implementation constraints that guar-
antee security objectives. Unfortunately, verifying the correct decomposition
and its enforcement in the system architecture is an overwhelming task. Be-
cause requirements are often written manually, they can be contradictory
and inconsistent, which can lead to incorrect implementations. To overcome
these issues, requirements must be specified using a formal and unambiguous
language, traced through the system architecture, and automatically verified
throughout the development process.
In [31], the authors introduce a modeling framework for the design and
validation of requirements from a security perspective. The framework is
composed of a new language for requirements specification, an extension of
the Architecture Analysis & Design Language, for specifying security and
a set of theorems to check the requirements against the architecture. The
framework provides the capability to validate the requirements of several
candidate architectures and analyze the impact of changes to requirements
and architecture during development. This model-based approach helps soft-
ware architects and developers detect requirements and architecture issues
early in the development life cycle and avoid the propagation of their effects
during integration.
2.2 On Designing Privacy-preserving Protocols
The track offers approaches to formalize the transmission of private and confi-
dential information in protocols, guaranteeing that user privacy is respected:
– Formal, symbolic techniques for modeling and automatically analyzing se-
curity protocols are extremely successful and were able to discover many
security flaws. Initially, these techniques were mainly developed to analyze
authentication and confidentiality properties. Both these properties are trace
properties and efficient tools for their verification exist. In more recent years
anonymity-like properties have received increasing interest. Many flavors of
anonymity properties are naturally expressed in terms of indistinguishability
and modeled as an observational equivalence in process calculi.
In [26], the authors present recent advances in the verification of such indis-
tinguishability properties.
– Within distributed systems with completely distributed interactions between
parties with mutual distrust, it is hard to control the (illicit) flowing of
private information to unintended parties.
In [40], the authors propose a novel model-based approach based on model
transformations to build a secure-by-construction multiparty distributed sys-
tem. First, starting from a component-based model of the system, the de-
signer annotates different parts of it in order to define the security policy.
Then, the security is checked and when valid, a secure distributed model,
consistent with the desired security policy, is automatically generated. To
illustrate the approach, the authors present a framework that implements
our method and use it to secure an online social network application.
– The users of location-based services (LBSs) are always vulnerable to privacy
risks since they need to disclose, at least partially, their locations in order to
receive personalized services.
In [18], the authors discuss the adaptation of differential privacy to the con-
text of LBSs. More precisely, assuming that the LBS provider is queried
with a perturbed version of the position of the user instead of his exact one,
differential privacy is used to quantify the level of indistinguishability (pri-
vacy) provided for the user’s position by such a perturbation. In this setting,
the adaptation of differential privacy can lead to various models depending
on the precise form of indistinguishability required. The authors describe
an example of these models, the (D,e)-location privacy, which is directly
inspired from the standard differential privacy model. In this model, they
present the characterization of (D,e)-location privacy for a mechanism and
also measure the utility of this mechanism with respect to an arbitrary loss
function. Afterwards, they present a special class of mechanisms, called sym-
metric mechanisms in which all locations are perturbed in a unified manner
through a noise function, focusing in particular on circular noise functions.
They show that under certain assumptions, the circular functions are rich
enough to provide the same privacy and utility levels as other more complex
(non-circular) noise functions, while being easier to implement. Finally, the
authors describe the extension of the above model to a generalized notion
for location privacy, called l-privacy capturing both (D,e)-location privacy
and also the recent notion of geo-indistinguishability.
2.3 On Automated Policy Enforcement
The track contributes formal approaches to policy enforcement, allowing the
design of systems that respect legal bounds by design and guarantee that the
other entities are treating private data properly:
– Handling personal data adequately is one of the biggest challenges of our era.
Consequently, law and regulations are in the process of being released, like
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which attempt
to deal with these challenging issue early on. The core question motivating
this work is how software developers can validate their technical design vis-
a-vis the prescriptions of the privacy legislation.
In [4], the authors outline the technical concepts related to privacy that need
to be taken into consideration in a software design. Also, the authors extend
a popular design notation in order to support the privacy concepts illustrated
in the previous point. Finally, they show how some of the prescriptions of
the privacy legislation and standards may be related to a technical design
that employs our enriched notation, which would facilitate reasoning about
compliance.
– Privacy is a major concern in large of parts of the world when exchanging
information. Ideally, we would like to be able to have fine-grained control
about how information that we deem sensitive can be propagated and used.
While privacy policy languages exist, it is not possible to control whether
the entity that receives data is living up to its own policy specification.
In [37], the authors present our initial work on an approach that empow-
ers data owners to specify their privacy preferences and data consumers to
specify their data needs. Using a static analysis of the two specifications,
they find a communication scheme that complies with these preferences and
needs. While applicable to online transactions, the same techniques can be
used in development of IT systems dealing with sensitive data. To the best
of our knowledge, no existing privacy policy languages supports negotiation
of policies, but only yes/no answers.
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